Evolution of optimal Hill coefficients in nonlinear public goods games
  • Metaadatok
Tartalom: http://real.mtak.hu/38722/
Archívum: MTA Könyvtár
Gyűjtemény: Status = Published

Type = Article
Cím:
Evolution of optimal Hill coefficients in nonlinear public goods games
Létrehozó:
Archetti, Marco
Scheuring, István
Kiadó:
Elsevier
Dátum:
2016
Téma:
Q1 Science (General) / természettudomány általában
QH359-425 Evolution (Biology) / evolĂşciĂł
Tartalmi leírás:
In evolutionary game theory, the effect of public goods like diffusible molecules has been
modelled using linear, concave, sigmoid and step functions. The observation that biological
systems are often sigmoid input-output functions, as described by the Hill equation, suggests that
a sigmoid function is more realistic. The Michaelis-Menten model of enzyme kinetics, however,
predicts a concave function, and while mechanistic explanations of sigmoid kinetics exist, we lack
an adaptive explanation: what is the evolutionary advantage of a sigmoid benefit function? We
analyse public goods games in which the shape of the benefit function can evolve, in order to
determine the optimal and evolutionarily stable Hill coefficients. We find that, while the
dynamics depends on whether output is controlled at the level of the individual or the
population, intermediate or high Hill coefficients often evolve, leading to sigmoid input-output
functions that for some parameters are so steep to resemble a step function (an on-off switch).
Our results suggest that, even when the shape of the benefit function is unknown, models of
biological public goods should be modelled using a sigmoid or step function rather than a linear
or concave function.
Nyelv:
magyar
Típus:
Article
PeerReviewed
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Formátum:
text
Azonosító:
Archetti, Marco and Scheuring, István (2016) Evolution of optimal Hill coefficients in nonlinear public goods games. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 406. pp. 73-82. ISSN 0022-5193
Kapcsolat:
627816