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Socially optimal contribution rate and cap in a proportional (DC) pension system

  • Metaadatok
Tartalom: http://real.mtak.hu/35839/
Archívum: MTA Könyvtár
Gyűjtemény: Status = Published


Type = Article
Cím:
Socially optimal contribution rate and cap in a proportional (DC) pension system
Létrehozó:
Simonovits, András
Kiadó:
Springer
Dátum:
2015
Téma:
HD32 Labour economics / munkagazdaságtan
HD34 Salaries / bérek
Tartalmi leírás:
In our model, the government operates a mandatory proportional (DC) pension system to substitute for the low life-cycle savings of the lower-paid myopic workers, while maintaining the incentives of the higher-paid far-sighted ones in contributing to the system. The introduction of an appropriate cap on pension contribution (or its base)—excluding the earnings above the cap from the contribution base—raises the optimal contribution rate, helping more the lower-paid myopic workers and reserving enough room for the saving of higher-paid far-sighted ones. The social welfare is almost independent of the cap in a relatively wide interval but the maximal welfare is higher than the capless welfare by 0.3–4.5 %. © 2015, ISEG.
Nyelv:
angol
Típus:
Article
PeerReviewed
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Formátum:
text
Azonosító:
Simonovits, András (2015) Socially optimal contribution rate and cap in a proportional (DC) pension system. PORTUGUESE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 14 (1-3). pp. 45-63. ISSN 1617-982X
Kapcsolat:
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10258-015-0107-0
MTMT:2989926; doi:10.1007/s10258-015-0107-0