College admissions with stable score-limits
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Tartalom: http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1306.pdf
Archívum: MTA Könyvtár
Gyűjtemény: Status = Published


Type = Book
Cím:
College admissions with stable score-limits
Létrehozó:
Biró, Péter
Kyselgof, Sofia
Dátum:
2013
Téma:
HB5 Mathematical economics / matematikai közgazdaságtan
LB2300 Higher Education / felsőoktatás
Tartalmi leírás:
A common feature of the Hungarian, Irish, Spanish and Turkish higher education
admission systems is that the students apply for programmes and they are ranked according
to their scores. Students who apply for a programme with the same score are in a tie. Ties
are broken by lottery in Ireland, by objective factors in Turkey (such as date of birth) and
other precisely defined rules in Spain. In Hungary, however, an equal treatment policy is
used, students applying for a programme with the same score are all accepted or rejected
together. In such a situation there is only one question to decide, whether or not to admit
the last group of applicants with the same score who are at the boundary of the quota. Both
concepts can be described in terms of stable score-limits. The strict rejection of the last group with whom a quota would be violated corresponds to the concept of H-stable (i.e.
higher-stable) score-limits that is currently used in Hungary. We call the other solutions
based on the less strict admission policy as L-stable (i.e. lower-stable) score-limits. We show
that the natural extensions of the Gale-Shapley algorithms produce stable score-limits,
moreover, the applicant-oriented versions result in the lowest score-limits (thus optimal for
students) and the college-oriented versions result in the highest score-limits with regard to
each concept. When comparing the applicant-optimal H-stable and L-stable score-limits
we prove that the former limits are always higher for every college. Furthermore, these two solutions provide upper and lower bounds for any solution arising from a tie-breaking
strategy. Finally we show that both the H-stable and the L-stable applicant-proposing scorelimit
algorithms are manipulable.
Típus:
Book
PeerReviewed
Formátum:
text
Azonosító:
Biró, Péter and Kyselgof, Sofia (2013) College admissions with stable score-limits. Műhelytanulmányok = Discussion Papers (2013/6). Institute of Economics, Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest. ISBN 978-615-5243-51-6
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